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assistance.￿The critical question arises when we look for an explanation of the preference for holding
money rather than capital goods. For capital goods will ordinarily yield a positive rate of return,
which money does not. What has to be explained is the decision to hold assets in the form of
barren money, rather than of interest- or pro￿t-yielding securities. (...) This, as I see it, is really
the central issue in the pure theory of money.￿John Hicks (1935)
1 Introduction
To paraphrase Banerjee and Maskin (1996), the coexistence of money and higher-return assets has
always been something of an embarrassment to economic theory. Despite being a robust feature
of monetary economies, it cannot be accounted for by the standard economic paradigm. The
dynamic general equilibrium models used for policy analysis evade the coexistence issue by either
imposing cash-in-advance constraints or by adding money into the utility function. Such shortcuts
are problematic, at best, as they introduce various hidden inconsistencies.1 Modern monetary
theory has made considerable progress in isolating the frictions that make ￿at money essential
(e.g., Kocherlakota, 1998), but the challenge of explaining why economic agents hold both ￿at
money and capital goods that yield a positive rate of return remains an unresolved issue.2 Even
carefully microfounded monetary models rule out the use of capital, or claims on capital, as means
of payment.3 Wallace (1980) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) propose models in which ￿at money
and capital do compete as media of exchange, but ￿nd out that the two assets can coexist only if
they have the same rate of return.
The objective of this paper is to adopt a mechanism design approach to explain the coexistence
of ￿at money and higher-return assets in an environment with explicit frictions that make liquid
assets useful. This approach is sensible as the essentiality of money can only be established by
applying mechanism design to a given environment, i.e., by comparing the set of incentive-feasible
allocations with and without money.4 By selecting among these incentive-feasible allocations the
1These inconsistencies are enumerated in Wallace (1998) and Wallace￿ s lecture on "Monetary theory at the
beginning of the 21st century" at http://economics.uwo.ca/conference/monetaryeconomics05/Wallace.pdf.
2This view seems to be shared by prominent monetary theorists, including Hellwig (1993) and Wallace (1998).
3Examples of such models include Shi (1999), Aruoba and Wright (2003), Molico and Zhang (2006), and Aruoba,
Waller, and Wright (2010).
4Kocherlakota (1998) and Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) were the ￿rst to use implementation theory to prove
1ones that maximize society￿ s welfare, mechanism design identi￿es the salient properties of good
allocations in monetary economies. If the coexistence of money and higher-return assets is among
such properties, then rate-of-return dominance is not a puzzle.
The monetary environment to which I apply mechanism design is the one in Lagos and Ro-
cheteau (2008), where capital goods compete with money as media of exchange. As in Lagos and
Wright (2005), agents trade alternatively in pairwise meetings, where there is a need for liquid
assets, and in competitive markets, where they can choose their asset portfolios. This environment
has the advantages of being tractable￿ thanks to quasilinear preferences￿ and amenable to mech-
anism design￿ thanks to periodic rounds of bilateral meetings.5 The answer to Hicks￿ s question
is simple: Money and higher-return assets coexist because such coexistence is both socially opti-
mal and individually rational. More precisely, whenever ￿at money is essential, a property of any
constrained-e¢ cient allocation is that capital generates a higher rate of return than ￿at money.
I ￿rst show that ￿at money is essential when the economy faces a shortage of liquid assets: The
￿rst-best capital stock is not abundant enough relative to the economy￿ s needs for a medium of
exchange. If the shortage of capital is small, then a constant stock of ￿at money implements the
￿rst best and the rate of return of capital is equal to the rate of time preference, which is larger than
the rate of return of money, which is zero. If the shortage of capital is large, then individuals lack
incentives to hold enough real balances to trade the ￿rst-best level of output: The nonpecuniary
return of ￿at money is not large enough to compensate agents for their time preference. In such
circumstances, society faces a trade-o⁄ between the role of capital as a liquid asset and its role as a
productive asset. In some circumstances the trade-o⁄ leads to over-accumulation of capital relative
to the ￿rst best.
the essentiality of money. Applications of mechanism design to monetary theory include Cavalcanti and Wallace
(1999) and Mattesini, Monnet, and Wright (2010) on banking and inside money, Cavalcanti and Erosa (2008) on
the propagation of shocks in monetary economies, Cavalcanti and Nosal (2009) on cyclical monetary policy, Koeppl,
Monnet, and Temzelides (2008) on settlement, Deviatov and Wallace (2001) and Deviatov (2006) on the welfare gains
of money creation, Hu, Kennan, and Wallace (2009) on the optimality of the Friedman rule, and Rocheteau (2010)
on the cost of in￿ ation. The use of mechanism design is especially important in multiple-asset environments since
under socially ine¢ cient trading mechanisms, ￿at money can be valued even though it is not essential.
5The tractability of the model comes at a cost: It shuts down the distributional e⁄ects of monetary policy. These
distributional e⁄ects, however, do not play a role in the argument developed in this paper, and while models with a
nondegenerate distribution of asset holdings can be solved numerically (e.g., Molico and Zhang, 2006), designing the
optimal trading mechanism for this class of models is currently out of reach. Notice also that a similar analysis could
be conducted in the context of the large-household model of Shi (1997).
2Under the most commonly used pricing protocols, it is not individually rational to hold real
balances if capital yields a positive rate of return. In contrast, in economies with pairwise meetings,
the optimal mechanism speci￿es a pricing schedule that gives agents incentives to hold money even
though capital has a higher rate of return. The pricing mechanism can align individuals￿incentives
with society￿ s best interest because the core in pairwise meetings is nondegenerate; i.e., there is a
continuum of allocations consistent with pairwise Pareto e¢ ciency, and agents are not indi⁄erent
in terms of which allocation is selected. As a consequence, a mechanism can punish an agent who
deviates from a proposed allocation by choosing his least-preferred trade in the core. The optimal
mechanism has two noticeable properties. First, it gives buyers a discount, in the form of a positive
surplus, for large trades. Second, buyers can enjoy this discount only if they ￿nance a fraction of
their purchase with ￿at money, i.e., ￿at money is more liquid than capital.
High-return assets play a liquidity role because the substitution of high-return assets (capital)
for low-return ones (￿at money) relaxes individuals￿participation constraint in asset markets. An
alternative way to relax agents￿participation constraint is by engineering a positive rate of return
for ￿at money. To analyze this possibility I consider the case in which the money supply grows, or
shrinks, at a constant rate. Under a socially optimal trading mechanism, the Friedman rule is not
necessary to maximize society￿ s welfare. There is a threshold for the in￿ ation rate, below which the
￿rst-best allocation is implementable, and capital is una⁄ected by changes in the money growth
rate, i.e., there is no Tobin e⁄ect. Moreover, if one were to compute the cost of moderate in￿ ation,
it would be zero. On the contrary, if in￿ ation is su¢ ciently large, an increase in in￿ ation reduces
real balances and welfare, and it raises the aggregate capital stock. For all in￿ ation rates above
the Friedman rule, the optimal allocation is such that capital goods yield a higher return than ￿at
money.
The use of mechanism design in monetary theory has been advocated by Wallace (2001, 2010).
(See Footnote 4 for a succinct review of the literature.) It has been applied to the Lagos and Wright
(2005) environment by Hu, Kennan, and Wallace (2009) to dismiss the usefulness of the Friedman
rule. I extend their analysis to a multiple-asset setup to focus on the coexistence of ￿at money and
capital. Zhu and Wallace (2007) and Nosal and Rocheteau (2009) construct trading mechanisms
in economies with pairwise meetings that are consistent with the coexistence of money and higher-
3return assets, but these mechanisms are not socially optimal.6 Kocherlakota (2003) establishes that
illiquid government bonds have a societal role when agents are subject to idiosyncratic preference
shocks. In contrast, I do not consider nominal bonds, and I focus on the social trade-o⁄between the
liquidity and productive uses of assets. Moreover, the liquidity of assets is determined endogenously
as part of an optimal trading mechanism. There are alternative explanations for the rate-of-return
di⁄erences across assets based on assets￿indivisibilities (e.g., Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright, 1996)
or lack of recognizability (e.g., Freeman, 1985; Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright, 2008; Rocheteau,
2009; Li and Rocheteau, 2009).7 I will show that rate-of-return dominance is a property of a
constrained-e¢ cient allocation even if capital goods are perfectly divisible and recognizable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. Section 3
determines the set of stationary, incentive-feasible allocations. The constrained-e¢ cient allocation
and the main result in terms of rate-of-return dominance appear in Section 4. The relationship
between in￿ ation and capital accumulation is studied in Section 5.
2 The environment
The environment is similar to the one in Lagos and Rocheteau (2008). Time is represented by t 2 N.
Each period, t, is divided into two stages labelled DM (decentralized market) and CM (centralized
market). In the ￿rst stage, DM, each agent enters a bilateral match with a randomly chosen trading
partner with probability ￿ 2 [0;1]. In the second stage, CM, agents trade in competitive markets.
Time starts in the CM of period 0. In each stage there is a perfectly divisible and perishable
consumption good.
There is a measure two of in￿nitely lived agents divided evenly among two types called buyers
and sellers, where these labels capture agents￿roles in the DM. Buyers￿preferences are represented
by the following utility function
c0 ￿ h0 + E
1 X
t=1
￿t [u(qt) + ct ￿ ht];
6In the search labor literature, the nondegenerate pairwise core is used to construct dynamics for the real wage
which can account for some business cycle facts of the labor market. See, e.g., Hall (2005), Gertler and Trigari (2009),
and Shimer (2010, chapter 4).
7The literature on monetary models with pairwise meetings and multiple assets is reviewed in Nosal and Rocheteau
(2010). See also the survey by Williamson and Wright (2010).
4where ￿ ￿ (1 + r)￿1 2 (0;1) is the discount factor, qt is DM consumption, ct is CM consumption,
and ht is the supply of hours in the CM.8 Sellers￿preferences are given by
c0 ￿ h0 + E
1 X
t=1
￿t [￿￿(et) + ct ￿ ht];
where et is the DM level of e⁄ort. The technology in the DM is such that q = e. The ￿rst-
stage utility functions, u(q) and ￿￿(q), are increasing and concave, with u(0) = ￿(0) = 0. The
surplus function, u(q)￿￿(q), is strictly concave, with q￿ = argmax[u(q) ￿ ￿(q)]. Moreover, u0(0) =
￿0(1) = 1 and ￿0(0) = u0(1) = 0. All agents have access to a linear technology to produce the
CM output from their own labor, c = h.
The CM good can be transformed into a capital good one for one. Capital goods accumulated
at the end of period t are used by sellers at the beginning of the CM of t + 1 to produce the CM
good according to the technology F(k).9 See Figure 1. I assume that F0 > 0, F00 < 0, F0(0) = 1,
F0(1) = 0, and F0(k)k is strictly increasing, with range R+, and strictly concave. An example
of a production function satisfying these properties is F(k) = k￿, with 0 < ￿ < 1. Capital goods
depreciate fully after one period. The rental price of capital in terms of the CM good is Rt.
C M   () t C M   () t+1 D M   () t+1
1 + t k ) ( 1 + t k F
Figure 1: Timing
Agents cannot commit to future actions, and individual histories are private information. These
assumptions rule out (unsecured) credit arrangements and generate a social role for liquid assets.
Capital goods (or claims on such goods) can serve this role. There is also a ￿xed supply, M, of
an intrinsically useless, perfectly divisible asset called ￿at money. The price of goods in terms of
8Instead of having linear preferences over ct and ht, one could adopt a quasilinear speci￿cation of the form
U(ct) ￿ ht, with U
00 < 0. Provided that the non-negativity constraint on hours of work is not binding, the two
formulations are equivalent.
9Alternatively, production could take place through neoclassical ￿rms using labor and capital as inputs. See, e.g.,
Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2010). My formulation makes it a little easier to characterize the optimal mechanism
as the real wage is independent of the capital stock.
5money in the CM is denoted pt. In a pairwise meeting in the DM a buyer can transfer any quantity
of his asset holdings in exchange for some output. Moreover, he can hide his asset holdings but
cannot overstate them.10 For simplicity, I restrict sellers from holding assets from one period to
the next. As shown in Appendix C, this causes no loss in generality.
3 Implementation
I ￿rst describe the trading mechanism in the DM. The terms of trade in a bilateral match are
determined according to the following game. In the ￿rst stage, the buyer announces his real
balances, z, and his capital stock, k. A mechanism, o : R2+ ! R3+, maps the announced asset
holdings into a proposed allocation, (q;dz;dk) 2 R+￿[0;z]￿[0;k], where q is the quantity produced
by the seller and consumed by the buyer, dz is a transfer of real balances from the buyer to the
seller, and dk is a transfer of capital goods. The proposed allocation is chosen in the pairwise core
of the bilateral match.11 The trading mechanism is incentive-compatible if it is optimal for the
buyer to announce his asset holdings truthfully. In the second stage of the game, the buyer and
the seller simultaneously say "yes" or "no" to the proposed allocation. If they both say "yes," the
trade takes place. Otherwise, there is no trade. This second stage guarantees that the allocation is
individually rational.









k) is the trade in all matches in the DM, zp is the buyer￿ s real balances,
and kp is the buyer￿ s capital holdings. From market clearing in the CM, M=pt = zp, i.e., pt+1 =
pt = M
zp.
Bellman￿ s equation for a buyer in the DM holding z units of real balances and k units of capital
is
V b(z;k) = ￿
n
u[q(z;k)] + Wb [z ￿ dz (z;k);k ￿ dk (z;k)]
o
+ (1 ￿ ￿)Wb(z;k); (1)
10In Rocheteau (2010) I explore di⁄erent assumptions regarding the observability of money holdings. The insights
of the model are robust to the di⁄erent assumptions.
11Zhu (2008) proposes a coalition-proof game that guarantees that any trade in the DM is in the pairwise core.
In my context this game would work as follows. First, the buyer announces his asset holdings. Second, an allocation
is proposed. The buyer and the seller simultaneously accept or reject the proposed allocation. If it is rejected by one
of the two players, the game ends. Otherwise, the buyer makes a counterproposal. Third, the seller can choose which
trade is carried out, the buyer￿ s countero⁄er or the initial o⁄er.
6where Wb(z;k) is the value function of the buyer in the CM. Equation (1) has the following
interpretation. The buyer meets a seller with probability ￿, in which case he consumes q units
of goods and delivers dz units of real balances (expressed in terms of CM output) and dk units of
capital to his trading partner. The terms of trade, (q;dz;dk), depend on the (truthfully) announced
portfolio of the buyer. With probability 1￿￿, the buyer is unmatched and no trade takes place in
the DM.




z + Rk ￿ ^ z ￿ ^ k + ￿V b(^ z;^ k)
o
; (2)
where ^ z and ^ k denote the real balances and capital taken into the next day and where I used the
budget constraint according to which c ￿ h = z + Rk ￿ ^ z ￿ ^ k. From (2), the buyer consumes his
real balances and the return on his capital stock and chooses his next-period portfolio in order
to maximize his discounted continuation value, net of the cost of accumulating capital and real
balances. The maximizing choice of ^ z and ^ k is independent of the buyer￿ s beginning-of-CM portfolio
(z;k); and Wb(z;k) = z+Rk+Wb(0;0). Substituting V b(z;k) by its expression given by (1), using





￿rz ￿ (￿￿1 ￿ R)k + ￿ fu[q(z;k)] ￿ dz (z;k) ￿ dk(z;k)g
￿
: (3)
The optimal portfolio maximizes the expected surplus of the buyer, net of the cost of holding real
balances and capital. The cost of holding real balances is equal to the discount rate. The cost of
holding capital is the di⁄erence between the discount rate and the rate of return of capital. As the
buyer￿ s surplus in the DM is non-negative (from individual rationality), it should be clear from (3)
that R ￿ ￿￿1 for a solution to exist (otherwise agents would want to hold an in￿nite capital stock).
Bellman￿ s equation for a seller at the beginning of the period is
V s = ￿ f￿￿ [q(zp;kp)] + Ws [dz (zp;kp);dk (zp;kp)]g + (1 ￿ ￿)Ws(0;0); (4)
where Ws(z;k) is the value function of the seller in the CM. The interpretation of (4) is similar to




z + Rk + F(k0) ￿ Rk0 + ￿V s￿
: (5)
7From (5), the seller consumes his real balances and rents k0 ￿k units of capital in order to produce
F(k0) units of CM good. (Given that capital goods fully depreciate after one period, it is strictly
equivalent to buy or rent capital goods.) The seller￿ s choice of capital in the CM is such that the
rental price of capital is equal to its marginal product, i.e.,
F0(k) = R. (6)




k;zp;kp) to be incentive feasible is
￿zp ￿ kp + ￿V b(zp;kp) ￿ ￿Wb(0;0): (7)
The left side of (7) is the discounted value of the buyer in the DM, net of the investment in real
balances and capital. A deviation that is feasible consists of not accumulating money or capital in
the CM and not trading in the DM. The expected utility associated with this defection, the right
side of (7), is the discounted value of the buyer holding no asset in the next CM. Substituting V b













where I used (6), R = F0(kp). The allocation must also satisfy the seller￿ s participation constraint
in the DM,
￿￿ (qp) + dp
z + F0(kp)d
p
k ￿ 0: (9)





but it is implied by (8).




k), is restricted to be in the core, denoted
C(zp;kp;R).12 The next lemma shows that even though (8)-(9) are only necessary conditions
for an allocation to be incentive-feasible, no further restrictions are needed to make the allocation
(coalition-proof) implementable.
12The pairwise core is the set of all feasible allocations, (q;dz;dk) 2 R+ ￿ [0;z
p] ￿ [0;k
p], such that there exist no
alternative feasible allocations that would make the buyer and the seller in the match better o⁄, with at least one of
the two being strictly better o⁄. See the formal de￿nition in Appendix B.








k) 2 C(zp;kp;R); R =
F0(kp) ￿ ￿￿1; (8) and (9). This allocation can be implemented by the following coalition-proof
trading mechanism
[q(z;k);dz(z;k);dk(z;k)] = arg max
q;dz￿z;dk￿k
￿
dz + F0(kp)dk ￿ ￿(q)
￿
(10)




if z ￿ zp and k ￿ kp, and
[q(z;k);dz(z;k);dk(z;k)] = arg max
q;dz￿z;dk￿k
￿
dz + F0(kp)dk ￿ ￿(q)
￿
(11)
s.t. u(q) ￿ dz ￿ F0(kp)dk = 0,
otherwise.
The programs (10) and (11) de￿ne the mapping, o, between the buyer￿ s portfolio and the trade
in the DM. According to (10), if the buyer holds at least zp real balances and at least kp units
of capital, then the mechanism selects the pairwise Pareto-e¢ cient allocation that gives the buyer




k). According to (11), if the
buyer holds less than zp real balances or less than kp units of capital, then the mechanism chooses
the allocation that maximizes the seller￿ s surplus subject to the buyer being indi⁄erent between
trading or not trading.
Figure 2 represents graphically the mechanism in (10)-(11). For a given aggregate capital stock,
kp, the buyer￿ s surplus is Ub = u(q)￿dz ￿Rdk, while the seller￿ s surplus is Us = ￿￿(q)+dz +Rdk,
where R = F0(kp). The pairwise core (in the utility space) is downward-sloping and concave. The




k), are denoted ￿ Ub and ￿ Us. If the buyer
holds z ￿ zp and k ￿ kp, with at least one strict inequality, then the Pareto frontier shifts outward.
The mechanism selects the point on the Pareto frontier marked by a circle that assigns the same
utility level, ￿ Ub, to the buyer. If the buyer holds less wealth than zp + Rkp, the Pareto frontier
shifts downward. The mechanism selects the point on the frontier that assigns no utility to the
buyer, Ub = 0. Finally, if z + Rk ￿ zp + Rkp (i.e., the Pareto frontier shifts outward) but either
z < zp or k < kp, the mechanism will still select the point on the Pareto frontier that gives no
utility to the buyer. By construction, the mechanism is coalition-proof.
9b U
s U
p p k k z z ‡ ‡ and
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Figure 2: Incentive-feasible mechanism
In order to prove the rest of Lemma 1, I need to establish two results: (i) buyers have incentives
to report their asset holdings truthfully; (ii) they ￿nd it optimal to accumulate zp real balances and
kp units of capital given the mechanism de￿ned by (10) and (11). To show incentive compatibility,
notice that, by construction, the buyer￿ s surplus is weakly increasing with his asset holdings. There-
fore, the buyer has no incentive to hide any of his assets (and by assumption he cannot overstate















k ￿ 0, it follows that (^ z;^ k) = (z;k) is a solution to this problem.














From (12) the buyer enjoys a surplus in the DM that is equal to the one at the proposed equilibrium,
provided that he holds at least zp real balances and kp units of capital. Given that r > 0 and
￿￿1 ￿ R ￿ 0, the buyer has no strict incentives to accumulate more assets than zp and kp. If the
10buyer is short in terms of real balances or capital relative to the proposed allocation, the mechanism
chooses the least favorable trade in the pairwise core from the buyer￿ s viewpoint. Therefore, the
best alternative for the buyer would be to bring no wealth. The buyer￿ s portfolio problem can then
be reduced to the following discrete-choice problem:
max
￿








If (8) holds, it is optimal to choose (zp;kp).
Figure 3 illustrates the argument above. For sake of illustration I ￿x the buyer￿ s capital stock
to kp. The top panel represents the buyer￿ s surplus in a match as a function of his real balances.
If the buyer holds less than zp then his surplus is 0; otherwise, it is the surplus associated with
the proposed allocation. The bottom panel plots the buyer￿ s expected surplus, net of the cost of
holding real balances and capital. Given that the buyer accumulates kp units of capital, he will
choose to hold zp real balances.
There are alternative mechanisms to the one in Lemma 1 that implement allocations that satisfy
(8) and (9). For instance, consider the following mechanism. If the buyer￿ s wealth is at least equal
to zp + F0(kp)kp, and if he spends at least zp real balances, then the buyer enjoys a surplus equal
to ￿ Ub. Otherwise, he obtains no surplus. This mechanism has two features. First, buyers obtain a
better deal if they purchase a su¢ ciently large quantity of output. Second, the mechanism has a
pecking-order feature: Buyers must spend a minimum amount of money before they can use their
capital as means of payment.13
4 Optimal allocation
Mechanism design selects an allocation￿ called constrained-e¢ cient allocation￿ among all incentive-
feasible allocations, which maximizes social welfare. Society￿ s welfare is measured by the discounted
sum of buyers￿and sellers￿utility ￿ ows, i.e.,
W (fqt;ktg
1
t=1) = ￿k1 +
1 X
t=1
￿t f￿ [u(qt) ￿ ￿(qt)] + F(kt) ￿ kt+1g; (13)
13This pecking-order property is reminiscent to the one in Rocheteau (2009) except that it does not arise from an
adverse selection problem.
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Figure 3: Buyer￿ s surplus under the proposed mechanism
12where kt denotes the capital stock accumulated in t ￿ 1 to be used as an input in the CM of t.
Recall that time starts in the CM of period 0. In the initial period agents invest in k1 units of
capital, which corresponds to the ￿rst term on the right side of (13). In the subsequent periods,
a measure ￿ of matches are formed, and the surplus of each match is u(qt) ￿ ￿(qt). In the CM
of period t sellers produce F(kt) using the capital stock accumulated in the previous period, and
agents invest in the capital stock for the next period, kt+1. For any sequence, fqt;ktg
1
t=1, such that







￿ [u(qt) ￿ ￿(qt)] + F(kt) ￿ ￿￿1kt
￿
: (14)
The ￿rst-best allocation (that ignores incentive-feasibility constraints) is such that qt = q￿ and
kt = k￿, where u0(q￿) = ￿0(q￿) and F0(k￿) = 1 + r.






￿ [u(q) ￿ ￿(q)] + F(k) ￿ ￿￿1k
￿
(15)






u(q) ￿ dz ￿ F0(k)dk
￿
￿ 0 (16)
￿￿ (q) + dz + F0(k)dk ￿ 0: (17)
￿￿1 ￿ F0(k) ￿ 0 (18)
dz 2 [0;z], dk 2 [0;k]: (19)




k), must be in the pairwise core,
but this condition is implied by the maximization of society￿ s welfare. To see this, suppose that





t f￿ [u(qt) ￿ ￿(qt)] + F(kt) ￿ kt+1g:




t f￿ [u(qt) ￿ ￿(qt)] + F(kt) ￿ ktg ￿ ￿
TkT+1:



















k) is not in the pairwise core. Then, by the de￿nition of the core, there is an alternative




k ), such that

























k ;zp;kp), satis￿es the constraints (16)-(19) and generates a




k;zp;kp), which is a contradiction.
In the following I de￿ne the liquidity shortage of the economy, ￿, as the di⁄erence between the
level of wealth required to compensate the seller for the production of q￿ and the ￿rst-best capital
stock times its gross rate of return,
￿ ￿ ￿(q￿) ￿ (1 + r)k￿: (20)
Proposition 1 Consider an economy without ￿at money. A solution to (15)-(19) exists.
1. If ￿ ￿ 0, then qp = q￿ and kp = k￿.
2. If ￿ > 0, then qp < q￿ and kp > k￿.
The ￿rst-best allocation is implementable when the aggregate stock of capital provides enough
wealth to allow buyers to compensate sellers for their disutility of production. If there is a shortage
of capital, then the quantities traded in the DM are ine¢ ciently low and the capital stock is
ine¢ ciently large. In this case, society faces a trade-o⁄ between the sizes of two ine¢ ciencies:
1. The shortage of capital for liquidity use: ￿ k ￿ k, where ￿ k solves ￿ kF0(￿ k) = ￿(q￿).
2. The overaccumulation of capital for productive use: k ￿ k￿, where k￿ = F0￿1(1 + r) < ￿ k.
As a result of this trade-o⁄, it is socially optimal to overaccumulate capital in order to mitigate
the economywide shortage of liquid assets, and to keep the capital stock lower than the level that
maximizes the total surplus in pairwise meetings, k 2 (k￿;￿ k).15
15This result is reminiscent of the one in Wallace (1980) in the context of overlapping generation economies and
Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) in the context of random-matching economies.
14Proposition 2 Consider an economy with a constant supply of ￿at money. A solution to (15)-(19)
exists.
1. If ￿ ￿ 0, then qp = q￿ and kp = k￿.
2. If 0 < ￿ ￿
￿[u(q￿)￿￿(q￿)]
r , then zp = d
p
z > 0, qp = q￿ and kp = k￿.
3. If ￿ >
￿[u(q￿)￿￿(q￿)]
r , then zp = d
p
z > 0, qp < q￿ and d
p
k = kp such that F0(kp) 2 (1;￿￿1].
Moreover, if r + F00(k￿)k￿ > 0, then kp > k￿.
The ￿rst part of Proposition 2 shows that money plays no essential role when the ￿rst-best level
of the capital stock is larger than buyers￿liquidity needs in the DM. If the existing capital provides
enough wealth to trade the ￿rst best, adding an outside asset cannot raise welfare.
The second part of Proposition 2 shows that if there is a liquidity shortage but this shortage
is not too large, then the ￿rst-best allocation is implementable with a constant money supply. In
an economy without money, the buyer￿ s participation constraint in the CM is not binding, whereas
the seller￿ s participation constraint in the DM is. (See proof of Proposition 1). Therefore, it
is incentive-feasible to require buyers to hold real balances in order to relax sellers￿participation
constraint in the DM, which raises output. The upper bound for the liquidity shortage below which
the ￿rst best is implementable is de￿ned as follows: The opportunity cost of holding a quantity of
real balances corresponding to the size of the liquidity shortage, r￿, must be equal to the expected
bene￿t from trading the ￿rst-best output in the DM, ￿ [u(q￿) ￿ ￿ (q￿)].
When the liquidity shortage is large, then the ￿rst-best allocation is no longer implementable.
The quantity of real balances that would be required to ￿ll the liquidity gap, ￿, would make buyers
unwilling to participate in the CM, given the cost of holding money: The buyer￿ s participation
constraint is binding at the constrained optimum. Accumulating 1
1+r additional units of capital
beyond the ￿rst-best level has two opposite e⁄ects on the buyer￿ s participation constraint in the
CM. On the one hand, 1
1+r units of capital can be substituted for one unit of real balances without
a⁄ecting the output traded in the DM. Because capital has a higher return than ￿at money, this
substitution relaxes the buyer￿ s participation constraint. On the other hand, increasing k above k￿
reduces R below 1+r, which makes it costly to hold the existing capital stock. If r+F00(k￿)k￿ > 0,
then the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates and it is optimal to accumulate capital beyond the ￿rst-best level.
15Figure 4 provides a numerical example with the overaccumulation of capital. I adopt the
following functional forms: F(k) = Ak￿, ￿(q) = q, and u(q) = 2
p
q. For these functional forms,
over-accumulation requires ￿ > ￿. When trading frictions are severe, the ￿rst-best allocation is
not implementable and it is optimal to accumulate capital above k￿ (top left panel). The rate of
return of capital falls below the rate of time preference, but it is always strictly positive (top right
panel). When the trading probability in the DM is su¢ ciently large, buyers have incentives to hold
su¢ cient real balances to trade the ￿rst-best level of output without distorting the capital stock.
Figure 5 provides an example where ￿ < ￿. Irrespective of the frictions in the DM, the capital
stock stays at its e¢ cient level (top left panel), and the real interest rate is equal to the rate of
time preference (top right panel). As the frequency of trade increases, output and real balances
increase until the ￿rst-best allocation is achieved.
Figure 4: A = 1:1, ￿ = 0:95, r = 0:2
Irrespective of the size of the liquidity shortage, the rate of return of capital is greater than
the rate of return of money. Thus, rate-of-return dominance is a property of a constrained-e¢ cient
allocation. This result is in sharp contrast with the rate-of-return-equality principle in Wallace
16Figure 5: A = 2, ￿ = 0:2, r = 0:2
(1980) under price taking and in Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) under bargaining. To understand
this result, suppose that the rates of return of all assets are equalized, F0(k) = 1. In such a situation,
replacing one unit of real balances with one unit of capital does not provide buyers with additional
incentives to participate in the CM. Therefore, reducing the capital stock has two social bene￿ts:
(i) By raising R above one, it reduces the cost of holding the existing capital, which relaxes the
buyer￿ s participation constraint; (ii) It reduces the social cost stemming from an overaccumulated
capital stock. This establishes that rate-of-return equality is not socially desirable.
Moreover, from Lemma 1, rate-of-return dominance is incentive feasible. An optimal trading
mechanism speci￿es a nonlinear pricing rule that guarantees that agents carry the portfolio of assets
corresponding to the constrained-e¢ cient allocation. For instance, if buyers accumulate more than
kp units of capital, then they receive no additional surplus in the DM relative to their surplus
at the constrained-e¢ cient allocation; if they hold less than zp real balances, then they receive
no surplus at all. The fact that the trading mechanism can punish or reward agents depending
on the portfolio they carry is a feature of a nondegenerate core in pairwise meetings, i.e., there
is more than one Pareto-optimal allocation, and these allocations can be ranked by buyers. The
17least-preferred of these allocations can be used as a punishment if the buyer fails to comply with a
proposed allocation.
5 In￿ ation and capital
A constant supply of money fails to implement the ￿rst-best allocation when the shortage of capital
relative to the liquidity needs of the economy, ￿, is large. In this case it can be optimal to over-
accumulate capital (relative to the ￿rst best) because a more abundant supply of high-return assets
relaxes buyers￿participation constraints in the CM. An alternative would be to engineer a higher
return for ￿at money by contracting the money supply. In order to study this possibility I extend the
model to allow for money growth and to investigate the relationship between capital and in￿ ation.
The quantity of ￿at money per buyer at the beginning of period t is Mt > 0, with Mt+1 = ￿Mt.
The money growth rate, ￿ ￿ 1 + ￿, is constant, and new money is injected by lump-sum transfers
(or taxes if ￿ < 1) in the CM.16 Since I focus on stationary allocations, Mt
pt is constant over time
and, as a consequence,
pt+1
pt = ￿.




z + Rk ￿ ￿^ z ￿ ^ k + T + ￿V b(^ z;^ k)
o
; (21)
where T = (Mt+1 ￿ Mt)=2pt is the lump-sum transfer. In order to hold ^ z real balances in the next
period, the buyer must accumulate ￿^ z units of current real balances (since the rate of return of ￿at
money is ￿￿1). Substituting V b by its expression given by (1), the buyer￿ s individual-rationality





















zp, represents the cost of holding real balances due to
in￿ ation and time preference. The constrained-e¢ cient allocation solves (15)-(19), where (16) is
replaced with (22).
16In the case where ￿ < 0, I assume that the government has the power to impose in￿nite penalties on agents
who do not pay taxes. The government, however, does not have the technology to monitor DM and CM trades and
cannot observe agents￿asset holdings. In contrast, Hu, Kennan, and Wallace (2009) and Andolfatto (2010) assume
that agents can avoid paying taxes by skipping the CM. In this case, there is an upper bound on the rate at which
the government can contract the money supply and, in some cases, the Friedman rule is not feasible.






> ￿ such that
1. For all ￿ ￿ ￿￿, qp = q￿ and kp = k￿.
2. For all ￿ > ￿￿, qp < q￿ and F0(kp) 2 (￿￿1;￿￿1]. Moreover, if ￿ > 1
F00(k￿)k￿+1+r, then kp > k￿.
The Friedman rule is optimal, but it is not required to maximize society￿ s welfare.17 For
all money growth rates below ￿￿, the ￿rst-best allocation is implementable. As a consequence,
moderate in￿ ation rates generate no welfare cost, and there is no Tobin e⁄ect. If the money growth
rate is above ￿￿, then the buyer has no incentive to participate in the CM if he has to accumulate
enough real balances to supplement the shortage of capital, ￿. In this case, the quantities traded
in the DM are ine¢ ciently low and, if the in￿ ation rate is su¢ ciently high, the capital stock is
larger than the ￿rst-best level. Even though the rate of return of capital falls below the rate of
time preference, rate-of-return dominance prevails irrespective of the in￿ ation rate. The argument
is identical to the one in the previous section: Capital can relax the buyer￿ s participation constraint
in the CM only to the extent that it has a higher rate of return than ￿at money.
To conclude this section I consider the special case in which the production technology is linear,
i.e., F(k) = Ak.18 The ￿rst-best capital stock is k￿ 2 argmax[Ak ￿ (1 + r)k]. If A = 1 + r, then
k￿ can take any value in R+. If A < 1 + r, then k￿ = 0.








~ ￿ = ￿
￿
1 +




where ~ q < q￿ solves








1. If A = 1 + r, then qp = q￿ and money is inessential.
17This result generalizes the one in Hu, Kennan, and Wallace (2009) to an environment with multiple assets.
18This case has been studied in the literature under di⁄erent mechanisms (Wallace, 1980; Lagos and Rocheteau,
2008).
192. If A < 1 + r and ￿ ￿ ￿￿, then kp = 0, zp ￿ ￿(q￿) and qp = q￿.






￿(qp) + ￿ [u(qp) ￿ ￿(qp)] = 0: (26)





￿ [u(~ q) ￿ ￿(~ q)] ￿
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Figure 6: Output, real balances, and capital under a linear technology, F(k) = Ak, with A < 1+r.
Provided that the in￿ ation rate is not too large, the ￿rst best can be implemented with ￿at
money as the only medium of exchange. (See the left part of Figure 6.) The threshold for the
20money growth rate, ￿￿, below which the ￿rst best is implementable is the same as the one in a pure
monetary economy. It can be interpreted as follows. The term ￿￿￿￿1 ￿ 1 is the cost of holding
real balances due to in￿ ation and discounting. The term on the right side of (23),
￿[u(q￿)￿￿(q￿)]
￿(q￿) ,
is the expected nonpecuniary rate of return of money, i.e., the probability that a buyer has an
opportunity to trade in the DM, times the ￿rst-best surplus expressed as a fraction of the cost to
produce the ￿rst-best level of output. The ￿rst best is implementable if the cost of holding real
balances is no greater than the nonpecuniary return of money.
In the nonmonetary economy, (z = 0), if A < 1 + r, then social welfare, ￿(1 + r ￿ A)k +
￿ [u(q) ￿ ￿(q)], is maximum at q = ~ q and k = ￿(~ q)=A. The introduction of ￿at money reduces
the ine¢ ciently high capital stock. If the in￿ ation rate is larger than some threshold, ~ ￿, then the
capital stock cannot be reduced to zero and buyers hold both money and capital. (See the right
part of Figure 6.) As in￿ ation increases, buyers substitute capital for real balances ￿ a Tobin
e⁄ect ￿ in order to keep their liquid wealth and output constant. In contrast, if the in￿ ation rate
is not too high, ￿ < ~ ￿, the buyer￿ s participation constraint is still slack when the capital stock has
been reduced to zero. In that case, real balances can be raised further to increase output, q > ~ q.
For such intermediate money growth rates, an increase in in￿ ation has no e⁄ect on capital but it
reduces DM output.
Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 7. The rate of return of capital is on the horizontal axis,
while the rate of return of ￿at money is on the vertical axis. There is rate-of-return equality on the
45o line. Underneath the 45o line there is rate-of-return dominance. In the overlapping generations
economy of Wallace (1980) and the random-matching economy of Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) an
equilibrium in which ￿at money and capital coexist can only occur in the knife-edge case where the
two assets have the same rate of return. In contrast, under an optimal mechanism, agents never
hold capital if there is rate-of-return equality, even if the DM output is ine¢ ciently low. Equilibria
in which both ￿at money and capital are held (the dark grey area) only exist underneath the 45o































Figure 7: Constrained-e¢ cient allocations under a linear technology: F(k) = Ak.
6 Conclusion
By applying mechanism design to an environment in which ￿at money and capital compete as
media of exchange, I showed that rate-of-return dominance ￿ the observation that capital goods
yield a higher rate of return than ￿at money ￿ is not a puzzle: It is a property of good allocations
in monetary economies. The use of high-return assets as media of exchange is socially desirable
to increase agents￿incentives to hold assets in situations in which credit arrangements are not
feasible. While it can be optimal to increase the capital stock above its ￿rst-best level to mitigate a
shortage of liquid wealth, it is never bene￿cial from society￿ s view point to drive the rate of return
of capital down to the rate of return of ￿at money. Rate-of-return dominance is consistent with
individual rationality thanks to a key feature of decentralized exchange, namely, agents meet in
small groups. Indeed, the nondegenerate core in pairwise meetings allows the trading mechanism to
assign di⁄erent liquidity values to di⁄erent assets. The same optimal mechanism that accounts for
the coexistence of money and higher-return assets has positive and normative implications, which
22are drastically di⁄erent from standard reduced-form models. For instance, the Friedman rule is not
necessary to implement good allocations and, for low in￿ ation rates, there is no Tobin e⁄ect and
no cost of in￿ ation.
I leave to future investigation the case of assets that are in ￿xed supply (e.g., Lucas trees) as well
as the coexistence of ￿at money and interest-bearing government bonds (see, e.g., Kocherlakota,
2003.) I also leave to future research the generalization of the argument to environments where
distributional considerations are taken into account.
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27Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. I will consider allocations such that the seller￿ s participation con-
straint, (17), holds at equality. This is with no loss in generality. If the ￿rst-best allocation is not
implementable because either (16) or (19) binds, then (17) has to bind. Indeed if (17) holds with a
strict inequality, then one can reduce dk to relax (16) or (19). If the ￿rst best is implementable and
(17) is slack, one can still reduce dk without upsetting any other constraint and without a⁄ecting
social welfare. In this case, the transfer of capital is not uniquely determined.












k + ￿ [u(q) ￿ ￿ (q)] ￿ 0 (30)
￿￿ (q) + F0(k)dk = 0 (31)
￿￿1 ￿ F0(k) ￿ 0 (32)
dk 2 [0;k]: (33)
1. A solution to (29)-(33) exists.
First, I show that one can reduce the set of admissible allocations to a compact set.
(a) q ￿ q￿.
Suppose q > q￿, i.e., u0(q)￿￿0(q) < 0. Consider the deviation that consists of reducing q
while maintaining k constant. This deviation relaxes the buyer￿ s participation constraint,
(30), and it increases the objective, (29). A contradiction.
(b) k ￿ max(k￿;~ k), where ~ k solves F0(~ k)~ k = ￿(q￿).
A solution, ~ k, exists and it is unique from the assumption that F0(k)k is increasing with
range R+. Suppose k > max(k￿;~ k). Then, F0(k)k > ￿(q￿) and q = q￿ is implementable
by setting dk =
￿(q￿)
F0(k) < k. Consider a deviation that consists of reducing k and dk =
￿(q￿)
F0(k) by an in￿nitesimal amount. Such a deviation raises welfare without upsetting the










￿0 = ￿￿1 ￿ F0(k) ￿ F00(k)k > 0:
Therefore (30) holds and the objective, (29), increases. This contradicts that k >
max(k￿;~ k) is an optimal solution.




. Therefore, from the Theorem of the Maximum, a solution to (29)-(33)
exists.
2. Implementing the ￿rst-best allocation
It follows from (30)-(33) that the ￿rst-best allocation, (q;k) = (q￿;k￿) such that u0(q￿) =





i.e., ￿￿(q￿) ￿ k￿. If the inequality is strict, the transfer of capital is not uniquely determined,
i.e., dk 2 [￿￿(q￿);min(k￿;￿u(q￿))].
3. The ￿rst-best allocation is not implementable, ￿￿(q￿) > k￿.
I ￿rst establish that dk ￿ k is binding. Suppose dk < k. Welfare can be raised by either
increasing q = ￿￿1 [dkF0(k)] (if q < q￿) or by reducing k (if k > k￿). A contradiction.











+ F(k) ￿ ￿￿1k
￿
: (34)
From the strict concavity of F0(k)k, the objective in (34) is strictly concave in k.19 The
19To see this, denote q(k) = ￿
￿1 [F













































+ F0(k) ￿ ￿￿1 = 0: (35)
Given that (q￿;k￿) is not implementable, (35) implies qp < q￿ and kp > k￿. Finally, I need
to check that the buyer￿ s participation constraint in the CM, (30), is not binding at the
optimum. This constraint can be reexpressed as










where the strict inequality comes from the strict concavity of u￿￿￿1 [F0(k)k]￿F0(k)k for all
k such that F0(k)k < ￿(q￿). Therefore, (30) is slack.
Proof of Proposition 2. Following the proof of Proposition 1 I will consider allocations
such that (17) holds at equality since if (17) is slack, dz or dk can be reduced without upsetting
any constraint. Moreover, from (16) buyers can be restricted from holding more money than they
actually spend, dz = z. Indeed, if z > dz then reducing z relaxes (16) without upsetting any






￿ [u(q) ￿ ￿(q)] + F(k) ￿ ￿￿1k
￿
(36)




k + ￿ [u(q) ￿ ￿(q)] ￿ 0 (37)
dk =
￿ (q) ￿ z
F0(k)
2 [0;k] (38)
￿￿1 ￿ F0(k) ￿ 0 (39)
z = ￿ (q) ￿ F0(k)dk ￿ 0: (40)
The rest of the proof proceeds in four parts. First, I establish that an optimal allocation, if
it exists, is such that F0(k) > 1. Second, I show that a solution to (36)-(40) exists. Third, I
characterize the conditions under which the ￿rst-best allocation is implementable. Fourth, I study
the optimal allocation when the ￿rst best is not implementable.
301. k < ￿ k, where ￿ k > k￿ solves F0(￿ k) = 1:
For all k ￿ ￿ k, F0(k) ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿1 = ￿r. Hence, one can reduce k by an in￿nitesimal










￿￿1 ￿ F0(k) ￿ F00(k)k
￿
dk < 0:
To analyze the other terms, I distinguish two cases:
(a) dk < k.





From (40) z is unchanged. Consequently, the left side of (37) increases.
(b) dk = k.


































where the last inequality comes from F0(k) ￿ 1 ￿ 0, dz > 0, and dk < 0. Consequently,
the left side of (37) increases.
For the two cases studied above, an in￿nitesimal decrease in k that raises welfare is incentive
feasible. This proves that k < ￿ k.
312. The mechanism design problem has a solution.




k), is in the pairwise
core only if qp ￿ q￿. From (37), zp ￿
￿[u(q￿)￿￿(q￿)]
r . Consequently, (qp;zp;d
p









￿2. From the Theorem of the Maximum, a continuous function
maximized over a compact set admits a solution.
3. The ￿rst-best allocation is implementable.
From the unconstrained maximization of (36), q = q￿ and k = k￿. The participation con-
straints (37)-(40) can be rewritten as
￿rz + ￿ [u(q￿) ￿ ￿(q￿)] ￿ 0 (41)
￿ [￿ (q￿) ￿ z] 2 [0;k￿] (42)
z ￿ 0: (43)
From (42), the ￿rst-best allocation can be achieved without money, z = 0, if and only if





￿ z ￿ min
￿
￿ (q￿);









￿ [u(q￿) ￿ ￿(q￿)]
r
; (44)






[u(q￿) ￿ ￿ (q￿)]
i
:
(If the inequality is strict, the transfer of assets is not uniquely determined.)
4. The ￿rst-best allocation is not implementable, k￿ < ￿
￿
￿ (q￿) ￿ ￿
r [u(q￿) ￿ ￿ (q￿)]
￿
.
32The Lagrangian associated with (36)-(40) is:
L(q;k;z;￿;￿) = ￿ [u(q) ￿ ￿(q)] + F(k) ￿ ￿￿1k
+￿
￿








F0(k)k + z ￿ ￿(q)
￿
:





￿ ￿￿0(q) = 0 (45)
F0(k) ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿
￿







￿￿r + ￿ ￿ 0; (47)
where (46) and (47) hold with equality if k > k￿ and z > 0 respectively. From the proof
of Proposition 1, if z = 0 then the constrained-e¢ cient allocation is such that (37) is slack,
￿ = 0. From (47), ￿ = 0. From (45) and (46), q = q￿ and k = k￿. A contradiction. So, z > 0
and (47) holds with equality. From (47), ￿ =
￿

















Substituting ￿ by its expression and rearranging the terms I obtain
F00(k￿)k￿ + r > 0:
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is a straightforward generalization of the proof of
Proposition 2. With no loss in generality, I assume that the seller￿ s participation constraint holds
at equality and that buyers do not hold more real balances that they spend in the DM. The
















k + ￿ [u(q) ￿ ￿(q)] ￿ 0 (49)
dk =
￿ (q) ￿ z
F0(k)
2 [0;k] (50)
￿￿1 ￿ F0(k) ￿ 0 (51)
z = ￿ (q) ￿ F0(k)dk ￿ 0: (52)
1. ￿F0(kp) > 1 for all ￿ > ￿.
Let ￿ k￿ > k￿ denote the solution to F0(￿ k￿) = ￿￿1. Assume k ￿ ￿ k￿. For all k ￿ ￿ k￿, F0(k) ￿
￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1 < 0. Hence, one can reduce k by an in￿nitesimal amount, dk < 0, so as
to increase the term F(k) ￿ ￿￿1k in (48). Next, I check that the constraints (49)-(52) hold.










￿￿1 ￿ F0(k) ￿ F00(k)k
￿
dk < 0:
To analyze the other terms, I distinguish two cases. If dk < k, then one can adjust dk so that





From (52), z is unchanged. Consequently, the left side of (49) increases, i.e., the participation
constraint holds.



























￿F00(k)k + ￿￿1 ￿ F0(k)
￿
￿￿￿1dk < 0;
34where the last inequality comes from F0(k)￿￿￿1 ￿ 0 and dk < 0. Consequently, the left side
of (49) increases.
To conclude, if k ￿ ￿ k￿, an in￿nitesimal decrease in k raises welfare. Hence, kp < ￿ k￿.
2. The ￿rst-best allocation is implementable.





z + ￿ [u(q￿) ￿ ￿(q￿)] ￿ 0
￿ [￿ (q￿) ￿ z] 2 [0;k￿]
z ￿ 0:








￿ z ￿ min
￿
￿ (q￿);
















￿ [u(q￿) ￿ ￿(q￿)]
￿(q￿) ￿ (1 + r)k￿
￿
:
3. The ￿rst-best allocation is not implementable, i.e., ￿ > ￿￿.
The Lagrangian associated with (48)-(52) is:
L(q;k;z;￿;￿) = ￿ [u(q) ￿ ￿(q)] + F(k) ￿ ￿￿1k
+￿
￿












F0(k)k + z ￿ ￿(q)
￿
:





￿ ￿￿0(q) = 0 (53)
F0(k) ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿
￿











+ ￿ ￿ 0; (55)
35where (54) and (55) hold at equality if k > k￿ and z > 0, respectively. From the proof of
Proposition 1, if z = 0, then the constrained-e¢ cient allocation is such that (49) is slack, i.e.,
￿ = 0. From (55), ￿ = 0 and from (53)-(54), q = q￿ and k = k￿. A contradiction. Therefore,
z > 0 and (55) holds at equality. From (55) ￿ =
￿

















Substituting ￿ by its expression and rearranging the terms I obtain
￿F00(k￿)k￿ + ￿￿￿1 ￿ 1 > 0;




Proof of Proposition 4. Cases (1) and (2) come directly from Proposition 3. Consider the
case A < 1+r and ￿ > ￿￿ so that the ￿rst best is not implementable. Following the same reasoning
as in the proof of Proposition 3, the constrained-e¢ cient allocation solves
(qp;zp;kp) 2 argmax
￿














k + ￿ [u(q) ￿ ￿(q)] = 0 (57)
￿ (q) = z + Ak (58)
z ￿ 0, k ￿ 0: (59)
Substitute z = ￿(q) ￿ Ak into (57) to obtain




￿(q) + ￿ [u(q) ￿ ￿(q)] = 0: (60)
From (60), it follows that if ￿A ￿ 1, then it is optimal to set kp = 0. Indeed if kp > 0, then a
reduction of k increases social welfare, (56), and it relaxes the buyer￿ s participation constraint. The
36highest value of q ￿ q￿ that satis￿es (60) is the solution to (26). Consider next the case ￿A > 1.




z. Thus, social welfare is maximum where real balances are














Let ~ q denote the value of q that maximizes z. It solves (25). The condition k ￿ 0 holds if
￿(~ q) ￿ z ￿ 0, i.e., ￿ ￿ ~ ￿, where ~ ￿ is de￿ned by (24). Consequently, if ￿ ￿ ~ ￿, qp = ~ q, zp is given by
(61), and kp =
￿(~ q)￿zp
A , which gives (28). It can be shown that ~ ￿A > 1. To see this, notice from
(61) that






￿(~ q) > 0:
From the de￿nition of ~ ￿,
￿ [u(~ q) ￿ ￿(~ q)] ￿
￿
￿￿1
~ ￿￿1 ￿ 1
￿
￿(~ q) = 0: (62)
Therefore, ~ ￿￿1 < A. If ￿ < ~ ￿, kp = 0, zp = ￿(qp), and qp is the largest solution to (57), i.e.,





￿(qp) = 0: (63)
From (62)-(63) and ￿￿1 > ~ ￿￿1, qp > ~ q.
37Appendix B: Pairwise core
Consider a match between a buyer holding a portfolio (zb;kb) and a seller holding a portfolio
(zs;ks). In the text I assumed (zs;ks) = (0;0). The pairwise core, C, is de￿ned as the set of
allocations such that










￿￿(q) + dz + Rdk ￿ Us for some Us ￿ 0 (66)
u(q) ￿ dz ￿ Rdk ￿ 0: (67)
If none of the constraints (65)-(67) is binding, then
q = q￿ (68)
dz + Rdk = Us + ￿(q￿) (69)
u(q￿) ￿ ￿(q￿) ￿ Us (70)
zb + Rkb ￿ Us + ￿(q￿): (71)
If (65) binds, then
￿(q) = zb + Rkb ￿ Us (72)
(dz;dk) = (zb;kb) (73)
u(q) ￿ ￿(q) ￿ Us (74)
zb + Rkb < Us + ￿(q￿): (75)
The results above can be summarized into three cases.
1. zb + Rkb ￿ u(q￿)
For all Us that satisfy (70), the feasibility constraint, (71), holds. Therefore, from (68) and
(69)










: dz + Rdk 2 [￿(q￿);u(q￿)]
o
:
38If the buyer￿ s wealth is larger than his willingness to pay for the ￿rst-best level of output,
u(q￿), then any allocation in the pairwise core implements the e¢ cient level of output and
the transfer of wealth is between the seller￿ s cost and the buyer￿ s willingness to pay.
2. zb + Rkb 2 [￿(q￿);u(q￿))
For all Us such that Us ￿ zb + Rkb ￿ ￿(q￿), (q;dz;dk) solves (68)-(69). For all Us 2 (zb +
Rkb ￿￿(q￿);zb +Rkb ￿￿ ￿u￿1(zb +Rkb)], (q;dz;dk) solves (72)-(73). I have used that, from
(74), the largest feasible surplus for the seller is when u(q) ￿ ￿(q) = Us, which from (72)
implies q = u￿1(zb + Rkb) and hence Us = zb + Rkb ￿ ￿ ￿ u￿1(zb + Rkb). This gives:


















￿ fzbg ￿ fkbg:
If the buyer￿ s wealth is less than his willingness to pay for the ￿rst-best level of output, u(q￿),
but greater than the seller￿ s cost, ￿(q￿), then the ￿rst-best allocation is achieved provided
that the seller￿ s surplus is not too large; otherwise, the buyer transfers all his wealth and
output is less than the e¢ cient level.
3. zb + Rkb < ￿(q￿)
For all Us 2 [0;zb + Rkb ￿ ￿ ￿ u￿1(zb + Rkb)), (q;dz;dk) solves (72)-(73). This gives:
C =
h
u￿1(zb + Rkb);￿￿1(zb + Rkb)
i
￿ fzbg ￿ fkbg:
If the buyer￿ s wealth is not large enough to compensate the seller for the cost of producing
the ￿rst-best level of output, then any allocation in the pairwise core is such that the buyer
transfers all his wealth and the output level is ine¢ ciently low.
39Appendix C: Sellers￿portofolios and the optimal mechanism
A simplifying assumption of the model is that sellers are restricted from holding assets from one
period to the next. I now show that this assumption is with no loss in generality.
Let (zs;ks) denote the portfolio of a seller and (zb;kb) the portfolio of a buyer. A mechanism
in the DM, o : R2+ ￿ R2+ ! R+ ￿ R2, maps the announced asset holdings of the buyer and the
seller into a proposed allocation, (q;dz;dk) 2 R+ ￿ [￿zs;zb] ￿ [￿ks;kb]. A stationary, symmetric
allocation is a 7-tuple (q;dz;dk;zb;kb;zs;ks).
The Bellman equations for a buyer and a seller in the DM, (1) and (4), can be written more
generally as
V b(z;k) = ￿
n
u[q(z;k;zs;ks)] + Wb [z ￿ dz (z;k;zs;ks);k ￿ dk (z;k;zs;ks)]
o
+ (1 ￿ ￿)Wb(z;k)
V s(z;k) = ￿ f￿￿ [q(zb;kb;z;k)] + Ws [z + dz (zb;kb;z;k);k + dk (zb;kb;z;k)]g + (1 ￿ ￿)Ws(z;k);
where the novelty is that the terms of trade, (q;dz;dk), depend on the portfolio of the seller. The




￿rz ￿ (￿￿1 ￿ R)k + ￿ fu[q(z;k;zs;ks)] ￿ dz (z;k;zs;ks) ￿ dk(z;k;zs;ks)g
￿
: (76)




￿rz ￿ (￿￿1 ￿ R)k + ￿ f￿￿ [q(zb;kb;z;k)] ￿ dz (zb;kb;z;k) ￿ dk(zb;kb;z;k)g
￿
: (77)







u(q) + dz + F0(k)dk
￿
￿ 0; (78)
where, from market clearing, k = kb +ks. Similarly, a necessary condition for sellers to participate
in the CM is
￿zs ￿ ks + ￿V s(zs;ks) ￿ ￿Ws(0;0): (79)
The seller can choose not to accumulate money or capital in the CM, in which case his expected








￿￿ (q) + dz + F0(k)dk
￿
￿ 0: (80)
40The buyer￿ s and seller￿ s participation constraints in the DM are implied by (78) and (80).





















s) ￿ ￿￿1, (78), and (80), can be implemented by the following
coalition-proof trading mechanism.








s) then the trade is
(q;dz;dk) = argmax[dz + Rdk ￿ ￿(q)]




dz 2 [￿zs;zb]; dk 2 [￿ks;kb]:
If both the seller and the buyer in a bilateral match hold (and announce) at least the real
balances and capital that they are supposed to hold at the proposed allocation, then the trade
is the allocation in the pairwise core that generates the same surplus for the buyer as the one





2. If zb < z
p
b or kb < k
p
b, then the trade is
(q;dz;dk) = arg max
q;dz￿z;dk￿k
[dz + Rdk ￿ ￿(q)]
s.t. u(q) ￿ dz ￿ Rdk = 0
dz 2 [￿zs;zb]; dk 2 [￿ks;kb]:
If the buyer holds less real balances or less capital than he is supposed to hold at the proposed
allocation, then the allocation corresponds to the preferred trade of the seller in the pairwise
core.
3. If zs < z
p
s or ks < k
p
s, zb ￿ z
p
b, and kb ￿ k
p
b, then the trade is
(q;dz;dk) = arg max
q;dz￿z;dk￿k
[u(q) ￿ dz ￿ Rdk]
s.t. ￿ ￿(q) + dz + Rdk = 0
dz 2 [￿zs;zb]; dk 2 [￿ks;kb]:
If the seller holds less real balances or less capital than he is supposed to hold at the proposed
allocation, and if the buyer holds at least the z
p
b real balances and k
p
b units of capital he
41is supposed to hold, then the mechanism proposes the preferred trade of the buyer in the
pairwise core.
By construction, the buyer and the seller have incentives to report their asset holdings truthfully
since their surpluses are nondecreasing with their money and capital holdings. Let us turn to agents￿






















￿rzs ￿ (￿￿1 ￿ R)ks + ￿
￿







































￿ [u(q) ￿ ￿(q)] + F(kb + ks) ￿ ￿￿1(kb + ks)
￿
(81)
s.t. ￿ rzb ￿
￿













￿￿ (q) + dz + F0(kb + ks)dk
￿
￿ 0 (83)
￿￿1 ￿ F0(kb + ks) ￿ 0 (84)
dz 2 [￿zs;zb], dk 2 [￿ks;kb]: (85)




k) is in the pairwise core since otherwise there would




k ), such that













































s), satis￿es the constraints (82)-(85) and gener-

















s = 0 is with no loss in generality.































s > 0 and/or k
p













from the original one as follows:



















k ￿ 0: (86)






















s ) satis￿es the feasibility conditions (82)-





s > k￿, with k
p













s. Therefore, it generates
a strict increase in social welfare. Suppose next that k
p
s = 0 and z
p
s > 0. If the ￿rst best is not
implementable, by the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 2, (82) and (83) are binding.
A decrease in z
p




s = k￿, qp < q￿,
and k
p
s > 0. One can set k
p0
b = k￿ and ks0

































The incentive-feasibility conditions, (82)-(85), hold. Therefore, social welfare increases.
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